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Benedict Anderson argues in Imagined Communities that "the magic of 
nationalism" is that it "turns chance into destiny" and "contingency into mean-
ing." Furthermore, Anderson suggests that the production of this magic nation-
alism-of-destiny-and-meaning rests upon the ability to "imagine a community or 
nation as deep, horizontal comradeship, regardless of actual inequality and 
exploitation."1 Senator Robert J. Walker's 1844 Letter on Texas Annexation 
epitomizes both aspects of this process of imagining a community, as it 1) 
reconfigures the complex politico-economic and cultural contradictions shaping 
the crisis of Texas annexation as a manageable, functional, political opportunity 
to realize the United States' national "destiny," while 2) vigorously avoiding the 
fact that Texas' slave-based cotton-economy was responsible for profound 
inequalities. While 30 percent of Texas' white population owned slaves, 72 
percent of Texas' real property, and 89 percent of the state's lucrative cotton 
market, only 2.3 percent of Texas' white population owned 20-or-more slaves 
(widely considered the general dividing Une between small-scale farmers and the 
"planter aristocracy"); hence, even within the ranks of Texas' slave-holding 
whites, property and wealth were distributed in a strikingly skewed manner.2 
Walker's Letter nonetheless portrays Texas annexation not as an expedient 
imperialist maneuver to support the politico-economic ambitions of the region's 
slave-holding elite, but rather as a burning opportunity to extend the "inevitable" 
promise of the United States' heralded democracy and economic equality. 
Walker's Letter is therefore a prime example of what Terry Eagleton calls the 
"actively organizing function of ideology,"3 as it attempts to create both a 
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conceptual vocabulary and a revisionist historical narrative capable of organizing 
complex subject matter into a digestible fiction that appears laden with the ready-
made historical legitimacy of national "destiny." Walker's letter is thus a case 
study in the rhetorical "logic" of rationalizing imperialism. 
My analysis progresses in three sections. Part one offers a broad historical 
framework that situates the debate surrounding Texas annexation within the 
larger political battles regarding national expansion and slavery. Part two begins 
by contextualizing Senator Robert Walker within the political milieu of Jacksonian 
Democracy and the Presidencies of Tyler and Polk, and then proceeds to a close 
textual analysis of the five primary theses of the Letter. Part three then concludes 
the essay by offering observations on the relationships among Walker's Letter on 
Texas Annexation, the sweeping cultural, technological, and political changes 
attendant upon the development of what Anderson calls "print capitalism,"4 and 
the development of a rhetorical "logic" rationalizing the United States ' imminent 
march towards "eventual continental dominion."5 This essay thus constructs an 
interdisciplinary culture studies framework that engages in a detailed textual 
analysis of Walker's Letter while simultaneously grounding this reading within 
the materio-historical context of the United States' "progression" into modernity. 
As such, I limit my comments on United States diplomatic intrigue, and focus 
instead on Walker's Letter as an example, even an allegory if you will, of a rapidly 
modernizing nation struggling to comprehend and rationalize its ascendancy as 
one of the world's dominant imperialist powers.6 
Historical Background: Why Annex Texas? 
Between 1790 and 1865, 835,000 slaves were relocated westward, with 85 
percent of these "exports" initiating from the once dominant tobacco, sugar, and 
rice-based plantations of Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, and North Caro-
lina. Approximately 75 percent of these relocated slaves ended up on the cotton-
based plantations of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.7 This massive 
transfer of slaves enabled a remarkable increase of cotton production in these 
states; indeed, by 1860 the U.S. Census reports that Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Texas account for over 63 percent of all United States cotton 
production.8 There is little question then, that the political-economy of cotton was 
pulling slavery southwestward. 
The shifting of such dramatic numbers of slaves to the southwest was 
consistent with the gradual realignment of the economies of the border states of 
Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Virginia, which were evolving in directions 
similar to those of the North, complete with labor forces of increased numbers of 
European immigrants and migrating laborers from the North. Laurence Shore 
argues in Southern Capitalists that opening up the economy to wage laborers 
indicated that the border states were undergoing "a pattern of economic develop-
ment that began to pull them closer to Pennsylvania and Illinois, and further from 
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Mississippi and South Carolina."9 According to Shore, certain critics even 
suggested that this "pattern" pointed toward the eventual demise of slavery as a 
viable politico-economic system; Texas was therefore crucial to how the United 
States understood the cultural and politico-economic consequences of this 
pattern, as Texas was touted as the promised land for the perpetuation of slavery. 
Indeed, between 1840 and 1850 the Texas slave population grew from 12,507 to 
48,145; by 1861 the slave population was over 169,460, an increase from 1840 
of 1300 percent.10 The slave population of Texas was small compared to that in 
Alabama and Georgia, but the growth rate was phenomenal, leaving little doubt 
in the minds of the planter elite that Texas was, as noted Texas historian Randolph 
Campbell describes it, "slavery's frontier."11 
Texas was also a frontier of another sort, as it was a constant hot-spot for 
military confrontations between westward white settlers, indigenous peoples, 
Mexican landlords, and pirate slave dealers.12 As early as 1819, a hodge-podge 
of squatters, mercenaries, and miscellaneous troops, under the leadership of 
James Long, a one-time student of Andrew Jackson, marched from Natchez to 
Nacogdoches to do battle with Mexican troops in the hope of establishing the 
Republic of Texas. Long's troops were stomped, but the Texans later won their 
"independence" in the infamous eighteen minute battle of San Jacinto, 21 April 
1836. Mexico in 1837 yet again abolished slavery, which meant that the 
continent's newest nation—ripe with the potential to become the most profitable 
slave-based cotton-economy in the world—was bordered not only by an enemy 
nation, but by one whose unpoliced hinterlands offered nearby refuge for 
runaway slaves.13 It is no surprise then, that Indians, Mexicans, and runaway 
slaves—all with legitimate grudges against the Texas cotton elite—formed 
temporary alliances to do battle with Texan slave holders. Indeed, the works of 
Herbert Aptheker, Wendell Addington, Paul Lack, and Richard Maxwell Brown 
suggest that such battles were a constant part of life on the Texas frontier, as the 
expanding geo-political agenda of the cotton elite and the attacks of settlers on 
existing Mexican and Indian land-claims produced a perpetual war economy of 
roving militias, squads of vigilantes, and gangs of drunken thugs.14 Noted 
American-Indian historian Ward Churchill reports that Texan/Indian violence 
was so prevalent that "the government of first the Republic, and then of the State 
of Texas, maintained a bounty on all Indian scalps until well into the 1870s."15 
There is no question then, that Texas was the new frontier not only for the political 
economy of slave-based cotton production but also for the many forms of military 
conflict and Indian removal that were so central to the cultural fictions "explain-
ing" Manifest Destiny. 
Texas was simultaneously a frontier of yet another sort, as it was a constant 
site of confrontation between the United States and its European competitors, 
particularly Britain. For example, the British had tried desperately to grow cotton 
in India, in order to offset the United States' international monopoly; when that 
venture failed, they turned towards Texas as a potential colony and/or politico-
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economic ally. England was not alone in this thinking, as Texas had (by 1842) 
established formal diplomatic relations not only with England, but also with 
France, Holland, and Belgium. Such Texas/European commerce was so profit-
able, and the promise of continued European demand for cotton so definite, that 
Texas President Sam Houston boasted in December of 1844: "If we remain an 
independent nation, our territories will be extensive—unlimited . . . the Pacific 
alone will bound the mighty march of our race and our empire."16 
There is little question then, given the intense emotions surrounding the 
debate over slavery's future, along with the perceived threat of imminent British 
adventurism, recurring Indian violence, and Houston's big talk regarding the 
imperial future of an independent Republic, that the push for Texas annexation 
was in great part a response to what was perceived as an impending crisis. No less 
a public hero than ex-President Andrew Jackson claimed that Texas annexation 
was a necessary defensive measure to protect the Union from the triple threat of 
British economic and military invasion, raids by savage Indians, and slave 
insurgency. Jackson feared that this unholy alliance, if left unchecked, could 
"raise a servile war, take New Orleans, arouse the Indians on our West to war, and 
throw the whole West into flames that would cost oceans of blood and hundreds 
of millions of money to quench and reclaim."17 It is not difficult to imagine how 
such apocalyptic rhetoric aroused the anxieties of the South; it is confusing, 
however, to try to fathom how such predictions of regional catastrophe addressed 
the interests of Northerners. 
One response of the Southern cotton elite was to portray Texas annexation 
not as a desperate situation of crisis management but rather, as a golden 
opportunity for economic advancement. For example, Democratic Senator 
Ambrose Sevier of Arkansas argued before the Senate on 7 June 1844 that "The 
annexation of Texas will enable us to monopolize, through the instrumentality of 
slave labor, the production of cotton and sugar... not only for our own markets, 
but the markets of the world."18 Such grand talk of global monopolies was no 
doubt appealing to both Southern capitalists and their business partners in the 
North, yet by including "the instrumentality of slave labor" as one of the 
prerequisites of this economic boon, Sevier corroborated Northern fears that 
Texas annexation was but another maneuver to bolster the fortunes of the 
"peculiar institution." As early as 1836 Benjamin Lundy argued that U.S. interest 
in Texas resulted from "a long premeditated crusade against the government set 
on foot by slaveholders, land speculators, etc., with the view of re-establishing, 
extending, and perpetuating the system of slavery."19 Both Jackson and Sevier 
argued for Texas annexation in terms that so clearly represented the exclusive 
concerns of the South's slave-holding cotton-producing elite that they literally 
confirmed the worst suspicions of anti-expansionists such as Lundy. It is clear, 
then, that constructing a cultural fiction that could enable a nationwide consensus 
on the issue required the use of more inclusive rhetoric. In other words, a 
hegemonic pro-annexation front could not be built by using such obviously and 
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exclusively pro-"slave power" arguments, but instead, required the production of 
pro-annexation arguments that would appeal to both small-scale Southern farm-
ing and Northern concerns as well. 
This is where race becomes a key issue: by linking the annexation of Texas 
as a necessary defensive measure to protect the Union with ever-present Northern 
racial fears, pro-annexation propagandists were able to produce a cultural fiction 
of an apparently national perspective. Indeed, one of the crucial factors in 
articulating this cultural fiction as a national concern was the claim that Texas 
would act as a "safety-valve" that would absorb westward moving slave labor and 
eventually channel Africans down into Latin America. For example, South 
Carolina's Democratic Senator George McDuffie argued, along with Senator 
Walker, that "if we annex Texas, it will operate as a safety-valve to let off the 
superabundant slave population from among us."20 The promised removal of 
Africans from "among us"—clearly an appeal to racist sentiments in both the 
North and the South, as well as to the dominant Northern anxiety over wage 
depression—transformed what was essentially a defensive reaction to a regional 
politico-economic crisis into a proactive cultural fiction of national proportions. 
My thesis then, is that 1) the arguments discussed above as rationales for 
annexing Texas—Jackson's "necessary defense" argument, Sevier's vision of a 
slavery-based global monopoly on sugar and cotton production, and McDuffie's 
"safety valve" theory—were preliminary attempts to articulate a cultural fiction 
broad enough to coalesce the various regional and class-based elements of the 
debate into a unified, hegemonic bloc, and that 2) the spectacular success of 
Senator Robert J. Walker's Letter on Texas Annexation followed from Walker's 
ability to incorporate the limited regional elements mentioned above within an 
even more grandiose, unifying, national cultural fiction that portrayed Texas 
annexation as the epic work of pre-ordained historical destiny.21 
Senator Walker's Letter on Texas Annexation 
Robert Walker graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1819 at the 
top of his class. By 1822 he was an established lawyer in Pittsburgh, apparently 
well on his way to fulfilling the legacy of his father, a distinguished Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Judge and veteran of the Revolutionary War. Then, in the Spring 
of 1825, Walker married Mary Blechynden Bache, the great-granddaughter of 
Benjamin Franklin and granddaughter of A. J. Dallas, James Madison's Secretary 
of the Treasury. Ms. Bache was also the niece of George Mifflin Dallas, who, at 
the time, was a prominent pro-Jackson Democrat in Pennsylvania politics. 
Walker was thus privy to the inner sanctum of the rising Jackson movement, with 
which he had been active since 1822. In 1826 he moved to Natchez, Mississippi, 
where he began a lucrative law practice and, courtesy of Jackson's decimation of 
the Choctaws and the ensuing 1833 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, which 
opened vast amounts of Western lands for bargain (and some say illegally rigged) 
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prices, embarked on massive dealings in Western land speculation. Walker then 
parlayed his legal and financial successes, along with his strong family ties and 
much-publicized letters of support from King Andrew, into politics; he arrived in 
Washington in 1836 as a Democratic Senator from Mississippi. In 1841 he was 
re-elected and returned to Washington as one of its most respected power brokers, 
complete with the flattering title 'The Wizard of Mississippi."22 
By the time of the Presidential campaign season of 1843/44, Walker had 
cemented his role as a leading pro-annexation spokesperson, which put him at 
odds with Martin Van Buren, who, despite his opposition to annexation and his 
badly fumbling the populist legacy of Jackson, nonetheless appeared a sure bet 
to win the Democratic nomination.23 The Presidency of John Tyler—who was 
universally condemned as "His Accidency" after he ascended to the Vice 
Presidency as a "reconciliation candidate" to Southern Whig swing-votes and 
then to the Presidency after the death of William Harrison—was a crippled 
embarrassment, leaving little doubt that Henry Clay would receive his party's 
nomination for President. Pro-annexation Democrats thus needed to find 
someone other than the eagerly waiting Van Buren who could defeat the Whig's 
Clay. The problem, however, was that annexation was still primarily a back-
burner issue, as Van Buren was fastidiously ignoring the question in the hope that 
he could return to the White House without having again to combat the imperial 
legacy of his legendary predecessor, while Clay, too, wisely avoided the issue for 
fear of its potentially divisive appeal to sectional rather than party allegiances.24 
It is not clear how this happened because both Van Buren and Clay seemed 
assured of their nominations and mutually pledged to silence on the potentially 
explosive issue of annexation (what Freehling calls "do-nothingism"!)25, but a 
coterie of pro-annexation Democrats somehow persuaded the lame-duck Tyler to 
postpone the Democratic convention from November 1843 to May 1844.26 
According to David Pletcher in The Diplomacy of Annexation, this inexplicable 
postponement gave Walker and pro-annexation Democrats the crucial window of 
opportunity needed to launch Texas into the national consciousness. The strategy 
was to torpedo the nomination of Van Buren (who was, after all, a much-loathed 
back-room banking man from New York) as a first step towards securing the 
nomination for a properly imperialist Southern gentleman, who, ultimately, 
would grease the political wheels for the immediate annexation of Texas.27 
Walker's most important contribution to this agenda was his Letter of Mr. 
Walkery of Mississippi, Relative to the Annexation of Texas, first published in the 
Washington Globe on 3 February 1844.28 The Letter was an unparalleled media 
sensation, reprinted in the millions not only in the Washington Globe, Philadel-
phia Pennsylvanian, and New York Herald, but also in privately funded chap-
books and pamphlets that, according to Frederick Merk, were "subsidized by a 
secret 'Texas Fund' established in Washington by wealthy Southerners and 
speculators in Texas lands."29 Walker's Letter was thus a privately funded piece 
of propaganda charged with the dual task of throttling Van Buren in order to open 
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the door for a pro-annexation Southerner to win the Democratic nomination and 
of drumming up national concern for Texas annexation. Walker was thus a pro-
annexation ringleader in his own right and a hired propagandist in the pay of the 
plantation elite; his Letter, then, was written for the specific purpose of producing 
a cultural fiction capable of 1) dramatically realigning the power structure of the 
Democratic party, and 2) articulating a unified "national" response to a series of 
politico-economic and cultural crises that were, as detailed above, fueled by 
contradictory regional anxieties.30 
Walker delivered on his task: the Democratic Review wrote that "The letter 
has been more extensively read and circulated, and produced a more powerful and 
decided effect upon the popular mind, than any publication of an American 
statesman of the present day." The Review even claimed that the Letter was "the 
principal cause in . . . the nomination and election of Polk to the Presidency."31 
The previously unheralded James Polk (during the campaign, disdainful Whigs 
mocked him with the chant "Who is James K. Polk?") won the Democratic 
nomination for President, with Walker's old political-guardian and blood rela-
tive, G. M. Dallas, chosen as Vice President. It comes as no surprise that Polk and 
Dallas, who were both ardent expansionists, appointed Walker to head their 
campaign committee in Washington and later, after winning the election, ap-
pointed him Secretary of the Treasury. 
The problem for Polk and the pro-annexation Democrats, however, was that 
although they managed to win the Presidency, the combined Northern votes for 
Clay and the Liberty Party's James K. Birney, both of whom ran on non-
annexation platforms, surpassed Polk's total by 47,462.32 In fact, FrederickMerk 
argues that if Birney voters had not fled the traditional Whig Party, "Clay would 
have carried New York and Michigan, and would have won in the Electoral 
College by a margin of 146-129."33 Furthermore, the lame-duck Tyler had 
already presented an annexation treaty to Congress that was soundly rejected in 
June of 1844. Thus, while there was neither a sweeping "mandate" for Polk nor 
for pro-annexation sentiments either before or during the early stages of the 
election campaign, Texas annexation was nonetheless approved by the House on 
25 January 1845 and then by the Senate on 27 February 1845, six days before 
Polk's inauguration. The question then, given this maddeningly complex 
political situation, is how did Walker's Letter achieve its remarkable "effect upon 
the popular mind?" 
I will attempt to answer this question by addressing Walker's Letter as a 
prime example of what Dubravka Ugresic describes as "national mythomania" 
Specifically, Ugresic describes national mythomania as the fundamentally mod-
ernist process by which the function of "building a new state, a new truth, of 
establishing the continuity of national identity," is pursued via the "distorting, 
touching-up, or counterfeiting of history."34 This is not to suggest that Walker 
simply strays from some organic bedrock of historical truth, for it is a foregone 
conclusion that all histories strive, at some level, to re-create the world according 
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to their historically specific cultural, political, and national assumptions and 
agendas. Rather, I want to examine his 1844 Letter as an attempt to produce a 
rhetorical state of "national mythomania" through the conscious manipulation of 
racist stereotypes, nationalist and imperialist fantasies, and subtle historical 
subterfuge of various forms. None of these strategies would work, of course, 
unless they somehow captured the imagination and rang true, as it were, with at 
least a large portion of the voting U.S. population. My purpose then, is to examine 
how Walker's Letter managed to construct one version of reality, one particular 
cultural fiction, that was, for a multitude of cultural and political reasons to be 
analyzed below, and in conjunction with a variety of specific historical factors to 
be examined below, taken by its contemporaries to be so persuasive. 
Walker begins his Letter with a nifty shift of vocabulary, as he states that he 
is "in favor of the re-annexation of Texas." Texas, as Walker sees it, "was once 
our own" (225:2), but was unforgivably "surrendered" as part of the Adams-Onis 
Treaty of 1819.35 Thus the question of annexing Texas is, for Walker, "a question 
of the re-establishment of our ancient boundaries, and the re-possession of a 
territory most reluctantly surrendered" (226:2, my emphasis). Texas annexation 
then, "is not a question of the extension of our limits, but of the restoration of 
former boundaries. . . of reunion" (228:2, my emphasis). Each of these lines 
attempts to shift the question of Texas annexation from the realm of expansion, 
annexation, aggrandizement and, in short, imperialism, to the realm of reclama-
tion, restoration, and reunion; that is, the United States is not robbing and 
pillaging Mexico, but simply and humbly "pursuing our ancient and rightful 
boundaries" (228:1). Pursuing this line of rhetorical revisionism, later editions 
of the Letter incorporated "reannexation" into the title. Walker of course realized 
that these boundaries were scarcely old, let alone "ancient," which perhaps 
explains his arguing so strongly for these so called "ancient boundaries" as being 
rightfully won in battle against "the usurper Santa Anna" (223:1). Indeed, it was 
in 1836 that, according to Walker, "The people of Texas resolved to resist, and 
perish upon the battle field, rather than submit to the despotic sway of a 
treacherous and sanguinary military dictator " (223:1, emphasis added). Walker 
explains that "short was the conflict, and glorious the issue," and that "The 
American race was successful" (223:1). Walker concludes his historical intro-
duction by claiming that, having won their freedom from Santa Anna, "The 
people of Texas, with unparalleled unanimity, decided in favor of annexation" 
(223:2, emphasis added). 
So, to summarize his opening arguments, Walker attempts to interpellate the 
diverse and often antagonistic populations of Texas into one homogeneous 
PEOPLE, complete with a unanimous will, who are already citizens of the United 
States by right of the "ancient" boundaries established both in the Louisiana 
Purchase of 1803 and then again in the heroic 1836 overthrowing of the "usurper 
Santa Anna." These republican warriors for freedom are, as Walker reminds his 
readers, members of "the American race." Texas annexation then, when framed 
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Figure 1: Walker's 1844 Letter on Texas Annexation repeatedly proph-
esies the imminent continental dominion of the United States. For 
example, after spending the first few pages of the pamphlet blessing 
America and attacking both Britain and Mexico, Walker claims that 
"Of all the forms of government, our confederacy is most specially 
adapted for an extended territory, and might, without the least danger, 
but with increased security, and vastly augmented benefits, embrace a 
continent" (230:1). As support for such grand rhetoric, the Letter 
closes with seven pages of elaborate tables detailing U.S. economic 
relations with over sixty-five foreign regions, including the "South 
Seas," "Peru," "Trieste," "Manilla and Philippine Islands," "Russia," 
"Australia," "British West Indies," "France on the Atlantic," and even 
one mysterious destination known as "uncertain places" (250-251). 
Thus Walker situates his Letter within a modernist discourse that links 
the fate of national sovereignty and cultural authority to an expansive 
economic reasoning that transcends geography, political affiliation, and 
even time itself. (The image appears here courtesy of The Library of 
Congress.) 
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in this light, is an obvious and unproblematic question not of what to do, but of 
how most quickly and smoothly to open the nation's arms to its racial, historical, 
and political brothers and sisters. 
I should note here that Walker's Letter was but one part of a viciously 
orchestrated attack against both Santa Anna in particular and Mexico in general. 
Indeed, the powerful Democratic Review published an essay in September of 
1844 that dovetailed nicely with Walker's assault on "the usurper," in which 
Alexander Everett wrote that "the death of Santa Anna, imperiously and peremp-
torily demanded by every consideration of humanity and justice, would have been 
a substantial and permanent benefit to his country."36 Prior to the rhetorical 
attacks launched by Walker and Everett, Thomas Walker Gilmer (the ex-
Governor of Virginia) published a fiery polemic in the Baltimore Republican and 
Argus, claiming that 
The fashions of dress are not more capricious in their changes 
than are the forms of the Mexican government. I apprehend it 
is destined for some time, to continue in a state of civil chaos, 
giving no sign of energy, but occasional spasmodic convul-
sions in a body of bigoted priests and mercenary soldiers.37 
This is not the place for an extended analysis of the sundry rhetorical tropes 
employed by United States politicians in the long tradition of smearing leaders 
and nations that stand in America's way; I mention the contributions of Everett 
and Gilmer toward the demonization of Santa Anna in particular and Mexico in 
general merely by way of qualifying the effect of Walker's Letter. Put simply, 
Walker's Letter was so successful in great part because he was able to tap into 
widely accepted racist and nationalist stereotypes that enabled his attack, in this 
case on Santa Anna, to ring true as "common sense." 
It is equally important to note, before proceeding into Walker's five main 
theses, that the striking combination of messianic fervor, nationalist aggression, 
and free-wheeling historical revisionism that structures his introduction is (along 
with its rhetorical consistency with previous European forms of nationalism),38 
deeply embedded within the tradition of American exceptionalism, in which 
treacherous political choices are consistently re-framed as pre-destined historical 
necessities. Indeed, the rhetorical switch to RE-annexation instead of simply 
annexation repeats one of the fundamental claims of America's Puritan past. As 
Sacvan Bercovitch observes in The Rites of Assent, while "Others might stake 
their colonial claims on royal patents or racial superiority or missionary rights, for 
the Massachusetts Bay Puritans it was a matter not of claiming rights but of 
REclaiming ownership." Bercovitch argues that this REclaiming attitude pro-
duced a consensus that "migration was a function of prophesy, and prophesy was 
an unlimited license to expand."39 One of Walker's first important rhetorical 
maneuvers, then, in terms of constructing a cultural fiction that can lure anti-
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slavery Northerners and moderate Southerners into the pro-annexation move-
ment, is to invoke a righteous sense of national destiny and mission that will ring 
familiar in the ears of the proud historical and political descendants of Puritan 
New England. 
Having constructed the groundwork for his cultural fiction, Walker proceeds 
into the body of his argument, which, for the purpose of analytic clarity, I have 
separated into five major theses: 1) annexation embodies the "will" of the 
Constitution; 2) annexation is a necessary defense against British invasion; 3) 
annexation will resolve the crises of slavery; 4) annexation will prevent economic 
collapse; and 5) annexation epitomizes the logic of modernity. In the following 
pages I analyze these five theses in detail. 
Thesis 1: Annexation Embodies the "Will" of the Constitution 
The debates surrounding the annexation of Texas were marked in their early 
phases by the question of whether Congress had the legal authority to annex an 
already existing nation into the Union. Walker's first thesis is accordingly an 
attempt to provide a definitive "answer" to such questions. Walker's constitu-
tional argument is therefore based on a form of hermeneutic wizardry; that is, on 
his assumed ability, much like that assumed later by Chief Justice Taney in the 
Dred Scott case of 1857,40 to decipher the true "intentions of the framers" (224:1). 
Walker's professed hermeneutic skills allow him to conclude that the Constitu-
tion is, essentially, equipped withlimitlessly expansive powers of absorption, and 
that "all the historical facts" (224:2) attest to this power. The crucial point in this 
first thesis, however, is not that the Constitution is geared for annexation, but 
more importantly, that such actions coincide with the "intentions" of Presidents 
Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams, and Jackson, with Henry Clay (Secretary 
of State under Adams, and leader of the Whig opposition) thrown in for good 
measure. Walker's first thesis is thus based on the rhetorical trope of metonymy: 
that is, the "intentions" of a batch of heroes, gleaned through highly selective 
readings of their diplomatic communications, is magically conflated into the 
supposed "intention" of the Constitution regarding the issue of annexing new 
States. To put it another way: the Constitution is made to equal the thoughts and 
wishes of Jefferson and Madison, et. al., while Jefferson and Madison, et al., are 
simultaneously made to embody the spirit and letter of the Constitution; anyone 
opposing the annexation of Texas is therefore not only an anti-Constitution 
trouble-maker but also a heretic performing a most unholy dance on the graves 
of the nation's preeminent statesmen. Thus Walker uses metonymy to conflate 
Texas annexation, the "intentions of the framers," and the wills of various heroic 
Presidents into one great flaming ball of Constitutional righteousness. 
In comparison to similar attempts by his contemporaries to employ me-
tonymy, Walker performs this task exceptionally well. For example, Thomas 
Prentice Kettell's Southern Wealth begins by asking the reader for "loyalty to the 
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Constitution," and ends by asking: "Is it not better to stand by the Constitution and 
the Laws?"41 The problem here, rhetorically, is that by equating the Constitution 
with Law, Kettell reveals the Constitution for what it is: specifically, a baffling 
legal document written by the rich and for the rich in a cunning attempt to 
persuade the masses to consent to their own disempowerment.42 Walker, on the 
other hand, employs metonymy in order to represent the Constitution not as a 
numbing icon of indecipherable legalese, but rather, as nothing more nor less than 
the embodiment of the will of the people. Michael Warner emphasizes the 
political use-value of such acts of metonymy when he explains that: 
Americans pictured law justified by its derivation from the will 
of the people. The legal-political order would be transcendent 
in its authority but immanent in its source. The trick was to see 
how law could be given to the people transcendently and 
received from it immanently at the same time.43 
My argument then—via Warner—is that this "trick" of textuality and 
legitimacy, of making the transcendent appear to be derived from immanent 
sources (i.e., the "People"), is pulled off with great flair through Walker's use of 
metonymy. Indeed, the various regional conflicts rising from anxieties over 
slavery and the question of who will benefit, in a politico-economic sense, from 
the annexation of Texas, are magically conflated via Walker's use of metonymy 
into a national historico-Constitutional issue of whether or not the current 
administration will honor the genuine "will of the people." 
Thesis 2: Annexation is a Necessary Defense Against British Invasion 
Walker's second major argument deals with the threat of British invasion and 
with annexing Texas as a necessary defense against this possibility. He states that 
"the present boundary is the worst which could be devised," as "it surrenders the 
Red River, and Arkansas, and their numerous tributaries, for thousands of miles, 
to a foreign power." And more: "It brings that power upon the Gulf... too near 
New Orleans . . . within a day's sail of the mouth of the Mississippi" (227:2). 
Walker then reminds his readers that Britain's government is "controlled by her 
aristocracy, the avowed enemies of republican government," and that "though 
saturated with blood, and gorged with power, she yet marches on her course to 
universal dominion" (239:1). The clincher follows: "and here, upon our own 
borders, Texas is next to be her prey (239:1, emphasis added). Walker then 
reminds his readers of Britain's various heinous acts in the War of 1812 (236:2-
237:1), lists its vanquished international enemies—now all servile colonies, and 
guarantees his readers that "to refuse to accept the reannexation is to resurrender 
the Territory of Texas . . . into the hands of England" (229:1). 
Such incendiary rhetoric echoes the previously-cited warning of Andrew 
Jackson that not annexing Texas would "throw the whole West into flames that 
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would cost oceans of blood and hundreds of millions of money to quench and 
reclaim." There are, however, two obvious problems with this threat: 1) Jackson 
specifically describes the question at hand as a Western problem, thus articulating 
the issue as a distinctly regional (rather than a national) crisis; and 2) Jackson 
includes a crass reference to the millions of presumably tax dollars that will need 
to be spent to reclaim these Western lands, thereby confirming the suspicions of 
both Northerners and moderate Southerners that their tax dollars have become 
little more than a defense fund for the Southwest's cotton elite. Jackson's threat 
is fundamentally rooted in pro-"slave power" concerns; the cultural fiction is 
therefore dramatically limited in both its scope and its potential appeal. Walker, 
on the other hand, drapes his prophesies of the imminent disasters looming on the 
West within rhetoric that is both nationalist and Biblical. For example, Walker 
concludes what I am calling his "necessary defense" thesis by issuing a remark-
ably Biblical warning: "Let all who have aided in producing this dread catastro-
phe flee the wrath of an indignant nation, which will burst forth like lava, and roll 
in fiery torrents over the political graves of all who shall thus have contributed to 
the ruin of their country" (239:2). 
What we have here, much as with Walker ' s use of metonymy to condense the 
"intentions of the framers" and the "will of the People" within the Constitution, 
is a gem of rhetorical trickery that would make Jonathan Edwards proud. Indeed, 
Walker's invocation of Biblical imagery clearly echoes a strategy Bercovitch 
describes as one of the fundamental tenets of Puritan symbology : specifically, "to 
give the country a past and future in sacred history, and to render its civic 
institutions a fulfillment of prophesy."44 In addition to striving for historical and 
cultural legitimacy via the borrowing of such familiar Biblical imagery and 
Puritan-ish ideological claims, the more obvious purpose of these mightily 
exaggerated passages is to expand the question of Texas annexation into a 
national concern. This maneuver is politically astute, for while the North's rural 
farmers, members of the working classes, and bourgeoisie might not give a damn 
about the demise of the Southwest's plantation elite, the return of King George's 
troops is entirely another matter. Walker's hyperbolic description of the immi-
nent threat from Britain therefore enables him to turn the shimmering cotton field 
dreams of the Southern plantation elite into a chilling national defense nightmare 
complete with Biblical overtones; in so doing, he is again successful in portraying 
Texas annexation, this time as a necessary defense zone against foreign invasion, 
in terms that conflate divergent regional anxieties into a unified national concern. 
It perhaps comes as no surprise, then, considering the rhetorical gymnastics 
involved in constructing this argument, to realize that Walker may have known 
full well that England had no such plans for either colonization or abolition. 
Indeed, in a letter from George Bancroft dated 19 June 1844, Bancroft informs 
Walker that "England has no desire to colonize Texas or to abolish slavery there; 
but does desire a monopoly of the Texas market under a virtually exclusive treaty. 
The issue then is, Texas for the British manufacturers and ship owners... or Texas 
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for us by reannexation."45 Bancroft's letter arrived four-and-a-half months after 
the first publication of Walker's Letter, so it may be the case either that Bancroft's 
measured analysis shocked Walker into realizing that his original claims were 
overblown, or that Bancroft's views simply did not correspond to Walker's 
reading of the situation. On the other hand, their mutual friendship and long-
standing correspondence would suggest that Walker, prior to publishing the most 
important document of his career, would likely have consulted his friend the 
world-class historian and intellectual regarding England's intentions. If this is the 
case, then Bancroft's letter may amount to a forceful restating of an ongoing 
debate between the two men. My analysis of Walker's Letter does not hinge on 
the question of authorial intentionality, yet the force of the Bancroft letter— 
particularly when coupled with the fact that rumors of England's intentions were 
never corroborated with any serious evidence—suggests that Walker's heated 
representation of England's intentions was not only rhetorical (in the traditional 
sense of seeking to persuade an audience with powerful language), but perhaps 
even willfully misleading. It would appear, then, that Walker calculated that 
hyperbolic threats of colonization and abolition, regardless of whether they may 
or may not have been valid, would trigger more politically-expedient chest-
thumping than would guarded discussions of market shares. 
Regardless of the level of Walker's conscious subterfuge, I again note that 
his Letter was so successful in constructing this "necessary defense" argument 
because, in great part, it was able to tap into and was reinforced by a series of 
related cultural fictions. For example, Walker's Letter received considerable 
support from the Democratic Review, which echoed the necessary defense 
argument in its July 1844 edition, where it warned: "To abandon Texas now is to 
invite for her British Protection and British Policy. It is to close round us the circle 
of British Power."46 Furthermore, during the Summer directly preceding publi-
cation of the Letter, it was widely publicized that on 18 August 1843, in England's 
House of Lords, Lord Aberdeen (the Foreign Secretary) and Lord Brougham 
openly debated the issue of how England might influence the Texas situation. 
Reports of this debate (which reached America via the packet ship Victoria on 19 
September),47 particularly when coupled with the fact that the controversial 
World Antislavery Convention convened in London that same Summer, clearly 
helped foster an environment of fear that was succesptible to Walker's hyperbolic 
claims that England was conniving to lure Texas from the fold.48 Indeed, news 
of the Antislavery Convention and the House of Lords debate contributed 
substantially to the widely accepted, whether correctly or not, notion that England 
was secretly maneuvering for the abolition of slavery in Texas, and that imme-
diate U.S. action was therefore required to prevent Texas from drifting further 
into the dreaded path of England's "march to Universal domination." Thus, while 
Walker's Letter was certainly the most widely distributed cultural fiction at-
tempting to spark the sense of an impending national crisis, it is clear that the 
Letter could not have succeeded in this task were it not for a series of interlocking 
and mutually reciprocal factors such as the support of the Democratic Review and 
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the frantic rumor mill regarding England's supposed abolitionist and imperialist 
intentions. 
Thesis 3: Annexation will Resolve the Crises of Slavery 
One of the dominant fears of the various working classes of the North was 
that their precarious economic situations would be threatened if large numbers of 
free Africans migrated into their already unstable communities. Walker was no 
doubt aware of these fears, so he accordingly warns that ex-slaves migrating 
northward "might earn a wretched and precarious subsistence, by competing with 
the white laborers of the North, and reducing their wages to the lowest point in 
the sliding scale of starvation and misery" (232:1, emphasis added). Walker then 
launches into an extended reading of the controversial 1840 Census which, to 
summarize briefly, "proved" that free Africans were ten times more likely than 
whites to end up in poor-houses, jails, asylums, hospitals, and so on. The Census's 
conclusions had been thoroughly repudiated as early as 1843, when Edward 
Jarvis reported in The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal that the Census was 
a rigged, "fallacious and self-condemning document," yet Walker cites the 
Census as evidence of incontrovertible scientific fact regarding the unfortunate 
fate of Africans in a free labor market.49 Indeed, Walker links the threat of wage 
competition with the threat of raised taxes—which the Census proves will be 
necessary to pay for the "millions of the negro race whom wretchedness and crime 
would drive to despair and madness" (232:1)—so as to convince further all those 
who would free the slaves that life after slavery would be, quite simply, 
impossible. 
An equally popular fear of Northerners was that Texas annexation was 
further evidence of runaway Southern control of national politics. For example, 
in 1837 William Channing, a Unitarian clergyman from Boston, wrote to Henry 
Clay that Texas annexation is little more than an attempt "to extend and perpetuate 
slavery."50 Such fears had been expressed the year before in Benjamin Lundy 's 
widely distributed The War in Texas; A Review of Facts and Circumstances, 
showing that this Contest is the Result of a long Premeditated Crusade against 
the Government set on foot by Slaveholders, Land Speculators, etc., with the View 
of Re-establishing, Extending, and Perpetuating the System of Slavery and the 
Slave Trade in the Republic of Mexico. The calamatous effects of this "premedi-
tated crusade" on the fate of democracy were denounced even more vehemently 
in Theodore Sedgwick's anonymous 1844 pamphlet, Thoughts on the Annexation 
of Texas, where he argued that: 
The annexation of Texas is but another name for the perpetuity 
of slavery\ and we who now enjoy the rights and hold the soil 
of the Union, must bid farewell for ever to the hope of relieving 
ourselves from the danger, the odium, and the disgrace insepa-
rable from this pernicious institution.51 
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Figure 2: Theodore Sedgwick's 1844 Thoughts on the Proposed Annex-
ation of Texas to The United States demonstrates many of the cultural 
phenomena described in this essay as marking America's movement 
towards modernity. Originally published as a series of anonymous 
essays—attributed to "VETO"—in the New York Evening Post, the 
pamphlet shown here illustrates the new possibilities of political com-
munication in a world where daily newspapers are beginning to reach 
mass audiences, where modern printing presses enable the reproduc-
tion of printed materials in unprecedented numbers at unprecedented 
speed, and where the modernizing transportation infrastructure en-
ables the distribution of these materials to distances heretofore beyond 
the reach of contemporary political debate. In contradistinction to 
Walker's Letter, Sedgwick argues that annexing Texas is but a ruse 
"for the sole and only object of perpetuating slavery" (p. 54). (The 
image appears here courtesy of The Newberry Library, Chicago.) 
Channing, Lundy, and Sedgwick each demonstrate aspects of the wide-
spread belief that the annexation of Texas was little more than an excuse for the 
untrammelled advance of slavery into new territory, and for the final hijacking of 
democracy itself by slave-power interests. Walker was clearly aware of such 
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sentiments, and accordingly "answers" such fears by claiming that Texas annex-
ation is not so much an issue of extending slavery and Southern political power, 
but rather, the surest and most livable way for the Union TO GET RID OF 
SLAVERY FOR GOOD. 
Walker supports this thesis by citing a series of figures "proving" that slavery 
is slowly migrating westward, and that it will, if left to its own internal logic, and 
aided by Texas annexation, "disappear from Delaware in ten years, and from 
Maryland in twenty, and have greatly diminished in Virginia and Kentucky" 
(233:2). Walker argues that Texas annexation will not only serve to accelerate 
this trend, but will culminate in the eventual removal of all Africans from the 
United States, as "they would be diffused gradually through Texas into Mexico, 
and Central and South America" (234:1). Walker summarizes this fiction with 
the magical claim that Texas would be a "safety-valve" that would act as "the only 
practicable outlet for the African population . . . into Mexico and Central and 
South America" (234:1). On each of these counts Walker attempts to portray the 
regional politico-economic contradictions involved in Texas annexation in broad 
national terms that appeal to widespread cultural anxieties regarding race. Thus 
Texas annexation is turned into a cultural fiction that promises not only the 
maintenance of white working class wages in the North, but also, the end of 
slavery in the South and the eventual removal of all Africans from the United 
States, with the extra added bonus of softening up Mexico and Latin America for 
future imperialist excursions to follow in the wake of the slave's migration. 
I note again that Walker's Letter received ample ideological support from his 
pro-annexation colleagues. Indeed, in the opening pages of this essay I cited 
Senator George McDuffie (Dem./SC) echoing Walker's "safety-valve" rhetoric 
in the Senate, 23 May 1844. Additionally, the Democratic Review continued its 
generous support of Walker's Letter when it published an essay in July 1844 
claiming that: 
Texas will open before it as an outlet, and slavery, retiring from 
the Middle and Southern States of the present confederacy, 
will find for a time a resting place there. But only for a time, 
for the irreversible law of population... will emancipate Texas 
in her turn, and the negro will then pass to a land of political 
freedom and social dignity under a congenial sky. He will pass 
without civil convulsion, and leave no domestic ruin in his 
path.52 
Whether any of these promised results were even remotely likely is not the 
point; what is important is that by projecting the annexation of Texas as a non-
convulsive and non-ruinous step within history's predestined unfolding, Walker 
(along with McDuffie and the reliable party hacks at the Democratic Review) 
created a rhetorical space for consensus in which pro-slavery Southerners would 
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not feel immediately attacked, anti-slavery Northerners could imagine a progres-
sive resolution of the issue in the not too distant future, and everyone concerned 
could avoid difficult domestic problems by latching onto the intoxicating promise 
of the United States' pre-destined role as a hemispheric empire.53 
Thesis 4: Annexation will Prevent Economic Collapse 
Walker's most lengthy passages support the thesis that not annexing Texas 
will, ultimately, destroy not only the economy of the South, but that of the North 
as well. For example, Walker states that: 
The products of the slave-holding States, in 1840, amounted in 
value to $404,429,638. These products, then, of the South, 
must have alone enabled it to furnish a home market for all the 
surplus manufactures of the North. . . Strike down these 
products by the immediate abolition of slavery, and the mar-
kets of the South, for want of the means to purchase, will be lost 
to the people of the North; and North and South will be 
involved in one common ruin. Yes, in the harbors of the North 
the vessels would rot at their wharves for want of exchangeable 
products to carry; the building of ships would cease, and the 
grass would grow in many a street now enlivened by an active 
and progressive industry... One universal bankruptcy would 
overspread the country (231:2, my emphasis). 
There is no doubt that the North was making a fortune off of its trade with the 
South, but "universal bankruptcy" was obviously not an option as long as the 
North could continue trading favorably with Europe.54 This is where Walker 
again plays the nationalist trump card, as he goes into a lengthy analysis of how 
foregoing the annexation of Texas would hurt not only the North, but also, of 
equally rotten significance, would bolster the trade of the Unites States' most 
dreaded European competitors. For example, Walker claims that in 1839 Texas 
consumed nearly one-fourth of the United States "domestic manufactures," 
worth some $1,687,082 (243:2). Also in 1839, however, Texas opened diplo-
matic relations with France, and then with both Holland and England in 1840, 
hence opening the door for these European economic rivals to siphon off United 
States trade. Thus the nice fat trade figure for 1839 dwindled, by 1843, to a paltry 
$190,604 (243:2). There is then, according to Walker's argument, a direct and 
ominous correlation between the drop in United States profits and the rise of 
Texas' relations with foreign economic powers. This trend, if left unchecked, will 
surely result in "Texas becoming a commercial dependent of England" (236:1). 
And so Walker argues that not annexing Texas will throw the entire nation into 
economic collapse and pave the way for accelerated European trade with Texas, 
the downfall of the United States. 
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Figure 3: While the cultural, political, and technological transforma-
tions of early-modern print-capitalism enabled Walker's Letter to 
reach millions of readers, they also enabled anti-annexationists and 
abolitionists to respond in kind. For example, Charles Francis Adams' 
1845 Report of the Massachusetts Committee to Prevent the Admission of 
Texas as a Slave State was circulated throughout New England, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Ohio, and was then submitted to 
Congress along with over 100,000 signatures endorsing its arguments. 
In a move anticipating the rhetoric that would later propel the Repub-
lican party to prominence in the North, Adams argues that annexing 
Texas is "an alarming encroachment upon the rights of the freemen of 
the Union, a perversion of the principles of republican government, 
and a deliberate assault upon the compromises of the Constitution" (p. 
3). (The image appears here courtesy of The Newberry Library, Chi-
cago.) 
It is instructive to note that Walker's nightmarish vision of "one universal 
bankruptcy" foreshadows the apocalyptic claims of economic disaster presented 
in such pro-slavery manifestoes as David Christy's Cotton is King (1855), 
Thomas Prentice Kettell's Southern Wealth and Northern Profits (1860), and 
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Stephen Colwell's The Five Cotton States and New York (1861), each of which 
argued that abandoning the cause of the Southern slave-power elite would 
produce nation-wide economic collapse. What makes Walker's Letter more 
convincing as a cultural fiction than these later documents, however, is that 
Walker's initial question of economic collapse is buried within the even more 
deeply resonant historical rhetoric of American "unity" vis-a-vis the threat of 
European economic competition and even military hostility. Walker's economic 
analysis is so persuasive precisely because he frames it within a cultural scenario 
that articulates a cross-class, cross-party, and cross-regional alliance of "Ameri-
cans" against perceived outsiders. 
In addition to constructing a rhetorically united American "People" who 
stand strong in the face of perceived threats from outsiders (and particularly the 
British), such broad nationalist claims also obscure the fact that Texas is, in 
contradistinction to the prevailing Jacksonian rhetoric of democracy and eco-
nomic equality, based on ^ profoundly unjust economic system. Indeed, as noted 
in the introduction to this essay, only 2 percent of the population of Texas owned 
20 or more slaves (the generally considered the minimum number required for 
inclusion in the "Planter Aristocracy"), which meant that Texas' economic elites, 
who accounted for 72 percent of the state's real property and 89 percent of the 
state's cotton production, were, much like their contemporaries in the rest of the 
South, in a position of remarkably anti-democratic politico-economic power.55 
Hence William Freehling's typically wry characterization of pro-annexation 
extremists as "the minority of despots living within a majoritarian republic," 
dovetails with his biting assertion that "slave holder republicanism was not very 
republican when it came to debating slavery."56 From an economic perspective 
then, Texas lingered, as a miraculous politico-economic dream of the capitalist 
elite—whether slave holders in the South or those merchants, manufacturers, and 
speculators in the North who stood to make a killing off of increased Texas 
trade—yet Walker portrays the issue as a national crisis of transcendent impor-
tance. 
The consistent preclusion of discussion of actual economic inequalities in 
favor of overarching nationalist rhetoric is precisely what Benedict Anderson 
refers to as the "magic of nationalism," in that it strives "to imagine a community 
or nation as deep, horizontal comradeship, regardless of actual inequality and 
exploitation."51 It is important to supplement this claim with the realization that 
Walker's masking of economic inequality via nationalist rhetoric is consistent 
with one of the fundamental tenets of Jacksonian politics. Indeed, Alexander 
Saxton summarizes the key Jacksonian practice of plastering over economic 
inequality with nationalist rhetoric as follows: 
Egalitarianism, posed as high principle, requires either a policy 
of leveling . . . or else a denial that differences in wealth carry 
any invidious significance... (Thus) while Jacksonians made 
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no direct effort to eliminate the economic base of class differ-
ence, they consistently rejected the concept of class hierarchy 
as applicable to the American Nation.58 
Walker's thesis that economic disasters will follow upon the heels of not 
annexing Texas is permeated with righteous nationalist rhetoric, but does not 
contain even one reference to the question of whose economy he is talking about. 
More specifically, his plea for annexation is made from the perspective of a 
wealthy land speculator who is apparently either unconcerned with or simply 
ignorant of the fact that such Jacksonian rhetoric, in terms of its relation to the 
actual distribution of wealth in the U.S., is essentially fictional.59 In terms of the 
rhetorical construction of Walker's cultural fiction, however, it is obvious that 
speaking in terms of some assumedly egalitarian national economy is more 
appealing than admitting (as Tyler's Secretary of State, Abel Upshur was fond of 
doing) that Texas annexation is primarily the work of the Southwest's slave-
holding elite.60 Thus Walker's Letter reproduces one of the principal ideological 
tenets of Jacksonian politics, as he avoids any discussion of economic/class 
differences by masking the economic agenda of the slave-holding capitalist elite 
within the glowing egalitarian rhetoric of the Nation. 
Thesis 5: Annexation Epitomizes the Spirit of Modernity 
Walker's most subtle rhetorical ploy is to portray Texas annexation as part 
of a grand historical epoch stretching off into the beckoning future. Walker 
begins this argument by noting that Texas is easily accessible by steam engine, 
which means that "He who would say that Texas is too large or distant for 
reannexation to the Union must have been sleeping since the application of steam 
to locomotion" (231:1). Thus the latest "scientific" breakthrough is enlisted to 
make Texas annexation appear to be a logical element in the imminent unfolding 
of history itself. Walker does not actually use the word "modernity" in his 
argument, yet his propensity—to link "scientific progress" with the political 
aspirations of the United States, supported by his remarkable hermeneutic ability 
to decode the hidden logic of history itself—clearly indicates that Walker is 
attempting to portray Texas annexation as an integral and unavoidable element 
in the long march of modernity. 
Walker portrays Texas annexation, with the help of the mighty steam engine, 
as foreshadowing the day when the United States will "embrace a continent" 
(230:1). The natural pull of history will not stop there, however, as "The 
reannexation of Texas would strengthen and fortify the whole Union, and 
antedate the period when our own country would be the first and greatest of all 
the powers of the earth" (235:2). The clincher follows when Walker states that 
the debate over Texas annexation is "one of the mighty movements in deciding 
the great question between monarchy and republicanism" (238:2). Thus the 
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mechanical power of the steam engine, the heroic expansion of the United States 
as a continental and even global power, and the Republican battle against 
European-style monarchies, are all conflated into the pre-ordained logic of 
modernity. That is, annexing Texas is not so much a question of geo-political 
expedience and the legitimacy of national sovereignty, but rather, an integral and 
even inescapable link in the boundless rush of history itself. 
It is again important to note that Walker's Letter received ample support in 
its creation of a cultural fiction that linked U.S. imperial claims to the "natural" 
pull of history. For example, in April 1844 the Democratic Review published an 
essay entitled "The Texas Question," in which it prophesied that: 
Our system of government is one which, rightly adminis-
tered—on the principle of State-Rights Theory—will bear 
indefinite extension; nor do we doubt but that in the fullness of 
time it is destined to embrace within its wide sweep every 
habitable square inch of the continent.61 
This is a remarkable passage, for in the midst of a defense of Texas 
annexation, we also find an endorsement for the essential pro-slavery argument 
of "state's rights," two references to a future that is already known, and a 
prophesy without a "doubt" that the United States will not only annex Texas, but, 
eventually, all of both Mexico and Canada. In comparison to such aggressive pro-
slavery and pro-imperialist claims, Walker's thesis regarding the relation of 
Texas' fate to the larger sweep of modernity seems almost moderate. The point 
here is that Walker's Letter was not acting alone, as a stray voice in the wind, but 
rather, as a carefully crafted element in a larger barrage of manifest destiny 
propaganda. 
Walker's "Letter," Print Capitalism, and 
Early U.S. Modernity 
In "Franklin and the Letters of the Republic," Michael Warner observes that: 
By the Revolution... the business of governing relocated itself 
from the context of town meetings and market-street conver-
sations to the realm of a public constituted in writing and print. 
The political discourse that ensued was not just a new way of 
carrying on the same old power relationships: it marked a 
critical shift in the arena of power.62 
It seems clear that Walker's Letter may be situated as an example of the 
dialectic Warner describes above as it achieves maturity: that is, as an example 
of the "arena of power's" expansion from divergent local, personal, and oral 
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levels of political "conversation" into more properly "cultural" and "national" 
questions engaged predominantly through mass-produced cultural fictions. With 
this thesis in mind, I conclude by offering some brief observations regarding the 
relationships among Walker's Letter, the political-economy of print capitalism, 
and the larger sweep of early modernity within the United States. 
It has been amply documented that one of the primary legacies of the 
Jacksonian era was the initiation of what we would call, using today's language, 
the culture industry.63 For example, Alexander Saxton, in The Rise and Fall of 
the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth Century 
America, notes that in 1830 there were 65 dailies in the United States with an 
average circulation of 1,200, selling for six cents a copy, and that by 1840 the 
number of dailies had risen to 138, whereas by 1850 this number had ballooned 
to 254 dailies, with average circulations of just under 3,000 selling for a penny a 
copy.64 Saxton points out that these remarkable changes were made possible by 
the development of new technologies of mass-production, which, by allowing 
printers to make more papers for less money, enabled the mass production of the 
first widely circulated daily papers. Based on this analysis, it seems clear that the 
technological advancements of mass production enabled the famous democrati-
zation of the presses that coincided with the rise of Jacksonian Democracy and the 
urban workingman's movement.65 
Saxton also reminds us, however, that these new technologies of mass 
production required massive capitalization; hence his observation that "At one 
end of this sequence lay a minimal price of entry and a prohibitive unit cost; at the 
other, a unit curve approaching zero and an investment curve rising almost 
vertically: mass illiteracy at one end, oligopolistic or monopolized control of 
communication at the other."66 There may have been a halcyonic period in which 
these two curves met in democratic equilibrium, but Saxton concludes his 
analysis with the sobering realization that, as the political-economy of print 
capitalism became increasingly undemocratic due to capital accumulation, 
"egalitarian rhetoric, which for the artisan editors had served as a weapon against 
the oligarchy, became for their successors a means of obscuring newly develop-
ing class separations."67 
There is a crushing (and fundamentally modern) irony here. Specifically, the 
technologies of mass production that enable the rising capitalist elite to cloak their 
increasing social power in the disguising rhetoric of egalitarianism and cheap 
commodities, which I take to be fundamentally non-democratic gestures, simul-
taneously provide the tangible, visible, and infinitely reproducible evidence, in 
the form of the mass circulation dailies, that one's friends, neighbors, and fellow 
citizens are sharing in the same social, cultural, and historical space, which I take 
to be the bedrock sense of "here" and "now" that makes the very concept of mass-
democracy functional. I am suggesting then, that the radically new means of mass 
production and distribution that we associate with the first phases of modernity 
enable a strange act of synecdoche, in which the mass-circulation of a text, which, 
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it might be thought, should lead to alienation and displacement, actually enables 
the individual reader to imagine him or herself, via his or her participation in the 
shared world conveyed in the text, as a member of some larger "imagined 
community." Indeed, as Benedict Anderson describes this process, "each 
communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs (in reading the paper) 
is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose 
existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest 
notion. . . . What more vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined 
community can be envisioned?"68 
In this sense then, Walker's Letter (which sold in pamphlet form for $3-per-
hundred, or three cents each) needs to be understood as a wonderfully illustrative 
example of one of the most important aspects of early United States modernity: 
specifically, the Letter marks the convergence of the new technologies of mass 
production that prompted the growth of print capitalism with the nationalist 
imperative for imperial expansion.69 Indeed, if we accept the premise that 
modernity is distinguished from previous historical moments by its use of 
technologies of mass-representation to launch "imagined communities" beyond 
the barriers of geography, language, and ethnicity, then it follows that Walker's 
Letter, the single most widely distributed piece of imperialist propaganda of the 
period, unmistakably announces the rise of modernity in mid-nineteenth century 
America.70 In short, the Letter signals a dramatic new convergence of political 
power, in which the technologies of mass-production fueling print capitalism, the 
geo-political aspirations of the slave-holding elite, Northern anxieites regarding 
race, and the nation's rapidly accelerating romance with Manifest Destiny find 
common cause in Walker's rhetorical "logic" of imperialism. 
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